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IN THE SUPREME COU·RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDITH M .. i.~i:\"':.\"OLOIS, 
Plainii f.f ·and Appellant, 
-vs.-
NOR~fAN ~r .. ltFa~JS, 
Defe-ndant wnd Respondent .. 
J STRODl}CTOR\~ S·TArr~~~·1ENT 
This is an appeal fro1n the District Court of Salt 
Lake Cormty in \vhich a jury returned a verdict in favor 
of the defendant in a suit brought b~y- plaintiff for dam-
ages for personal injuries suffered \vhcn she "\vas struck 
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2 
by the defendant\~_ autotnohilc as she \Va~ e.rossing State 
Rtreet at a point a little more than 20 fel~t south of First 
.. A Vt~nue in Salt Lake City. 
The parties \vill be designated as they appeared in 
t.he trial court. 
'"Phe stHterriL~nt of faG1~ in plaintiff's brief is not 
accepted by the defendant and should not be favorably 
con Ridered by this Court in view of the rule reiterated 
In lley1tolds 1J. W. lJ7 • Clyde & Co4 (Utah, 1956)~ 298 P. 2d 
531: 
t'Plaintiff presents her case on appeal by 
reciting facts tending most favorably to prove her 
claiirt. The opposite approach must be adopted, 
and it hardly bears repeating that in a case like 
this the factual gituation will be reviewed on 
appeal in a light most favorable to the party pre-
vail i ng be] 0\11.-' .'' 
Defendant presentf.;, in the folloVl-wg statement of 
fa-cts, the evidence the jury reasonably could have be-. 
lieved and the inferences and intendn1ent~ ,,-hif".h the jury 
could have fairly dra\vn therefron1, in arriving at it5 
verdict. in~ Re Richard's Estate. (Utah, 195(1), 297 P. 2d 
5424 
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State Street is a notth-~outh street, 42 feet 'vidt~ . 
.lnunedia tely north of the sr.Pne of this ac.ci dent, First 
A.venue, running do\\rnhi ll from the east, ends at State 
Street, forrning a 90 degree angle (Ex. 1). 
The only marked pedestrian cro:-:;s\valk crossing State 
Street was on the north side of the intersection. A half 
a bloek to the nortlt and a half a block to t.hc. south at 
North Temple Street and South Temple Street, there 
Vt;rere n1arkcd pcdcst rian eross\valks and stop and go traf-
fic lightf.! \Vere in operation { R. 54, 55) .. 
At about 4:30 p~m .. , 11artlt 25, 1958, defendant wa~ 
driving to "tvork in his automobile, and after· stopping at 
the stop sign controlling the ent:r~y- of ~'estbound Lrafr[c 
fro1n ·wir~t Avenue into State St rcct, he tnade a left turn 
to go south on State Street (R. 3H). 
Plaintiff, then age 84, had \Valked fTOln the L~ D. S~ 
~l,elnple through the bloek and behind the c·hureh offices. 
She ernerged from an alley onto the side"\valk on the 
\\-~est side of State Street, at a point directly oppo~itG 
the end of First Avenue (ft 69~ Ex. 2)~ Although the 
mar ked pedestrian crosswalk \vas then but a f cv·.r steps 
north~ and 8l1e krle\ov it ~Tas there, she chose to turn 
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south ("1~. 69). Se lived at 28 ~ orth State Street)' 1vhieh 
\VH~ Houtheast or the point ,vhere she entered State 
Street {r~x4 1). 
Plaintiff began to cross the Htreet at a point south of 
the telephone pole visible in the photograph, "ll~xhibit 2. 
The point of hnpaet i ~ 11 ot visible in the photograph~ 
~ince it "\\'as plaeed, as "\vill be seen, more than 20 feet 
~outh of the First _._.\venue curb liner 
~I·here were no \Vhit'-~ lines or other indications of a 
IJCde~t.t·ian C.J'OSS\va}k \Vhere plaintiff was "\\'"a1h::ing~ al-
though each of the other tVt'O crof.1sings at the intersection 
\Vere elea:rly lined as crosE·n~~alks (Ex. 2). 
·There v,.~as a wet sno"\v falling, which was described 
by the investigating traffic officer af.; the kind that slides 
do\vn the car and melts on the street, leaving the street 
v.ret, but \vithout a snow cover (R·~ 23). Defendant~s 
\vindsh l c l d ·l,, .. j p P rs 'C1 e an ed the sn 0'\'- from the 'vin d-
~hield so that he could see ahead of his car although 
ll1~ side 'vindo\vs were fogged up (R·. 24-, 3~). 
Just a.s defendant was "conring out of the i.urnn 
(R~ B7) and as lu: \vas loolring ahead through the wind-
~hield, he saw the plaintiff, who vlas then about 3 or 4 
fpet into State Street from the \Ve~t curb .. She "'aS \valk-
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ing in a generally eastern direction, holding a ne1vspaper 
~jver her head to sh·ield her head fron1 the sno\v storm. 
Aecording to the po1ice officer, defendant, at one 
thne, said l1e "W7 as 30 or 40 feet a\vay froJn her ~;Ju~n he 
first sa\,.' her (R. 17)4 He also told the offieer he 1vas 
'i3 to 4 feef~ a\vay (R~ 2-5 )4 He \-vas upset at that thne 
(R. ~5) ~ TllL~ officer discounted his state1nent, in vie'v 
of the other phy~ical fac·t~ (R.4 2-fi-28) ~ 
At trial1 defendant. marked the map 1vith a srnall 
~·x'' to shovl where }Hj bel icved h1 s ear \\7 US "\~lhen he first 
sa'\' plaintiff in the street (Ex. 1~ :1t .• :J7, 39). L"si.ng th~ 
s-cale of the map, l1e Vt'as then about 18 to 2~ feet north 
0 r the eventual point of lin pact and plain tiff '~;as then 
10 to 11 feet from that point. 
Defendant \Vas traveling at a 8peed of bet\veen 1.0 
and 1~1 miles .an hour, in a generally southern direction. 
Hr immediately applied his brakes to Rtop the automobile 
beC.R!JSC pia~ nt i ['f' COntinued to \Valk direr.tly into the path 
of h1~ car ( r-t. 52)4 
He had alrnost. stopped at the ti1ne of impact (R. 53). 
Plainti.ff ·\\·as knocked du\vn~ Defendant fo11nd her on 
the ~treet in1n1ediatel~y in front of the car, with her head 
facing to the south.. Plaintiff suffered bruises, a Inomen-
tary lapse of. eonsciousness, and a cracked ankle bone 
(R. 4fl, 67) 4 
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Plaintiff aduritted at thP trial Utat she did not look 
for traffic after she started ac.rn~s ·the street and she 
r1evcr t:la\v the antornobile that struck her (R. 5D~ 68). 
·rhi~ \vas {~01TOborated by defendant's testimony in \Vhic.h 
he stated that frorn the titnc he first saw her, \vhen she 
was about 3 or 4_ feet into the street l'rom the ruth, 
plaintiff never turned her head to look, had the news~ 
papet· (lVCr her head to shield her head from the snov,\ 
kept. \valklng in the sau1e Inanner and 'vithout reducing 
speed until she reaehed a point directly in the path or 
his a11tomohile (R .. 52, 53). 
rl,he investigating police officer arrived at the scene 
4 Tniuutes after being called and found tl1e plaintiff being 
assisted onto a stretcher lJ.V an arnbulance police officer 
1vho had ar-l"ivcd earlier~ ·.Plaintiff \vas 24 feet south of 
the soul.h c.u r b line of -~,i rst A venue and defendant~s car 
\\ras 1 foot nort.h of he:r. rPhere 'vere no skid marks and 
no marks upon defendant's automobile. There v,.~as no 
indi.r_ati.on that the ear had dragged plaintiff along the 
street and from an investigation of all the circumstances, 
the offic.er toncluded that the probable point of impart 
~~give or take a foot or t\vo~' 'vas about 23 feet south of 
the south curb line of First A venue~ and in the traffic 
lane closest to the center line, at a point 14 feet into 
t l u_~ s trePt from the v{est curb (RL 22, 23, 27) ~ 
Upon this state of the record, the trial court in-
8t.ructed the jury that plaintiff \Yf:ts negligent as a matter 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
of la"\\T in atterrtpting to cross the ~J.reet. V~t~here she did in 
vie\v of the prohibition found in Section 41-G-79 (c), Utah 
(~ode Annotated, 1953, v,:rhich reads~ 
"Between adjacent intersections at whieh 
traffic control signals are in operation, pedes-
trians shall not cross at any place except in a 
ntarked cross-w·alk~" (R-~ 109). 
Although not so requested by the defendant, the 
court alRo told the jury that the place \V here plain tiff 
attempted to cross \\1as not an "unmarkerl c.ross-vralk at 
an in terseetion,'' as that tern1 is used in Section 41-t1-79 
(a), and by reason thereof plaintiff \Vas required to 
yield the right-of-\\'ay to the defendant's automobile if 
it \vas so near as to constitute an im1nc dia te hazard to 
her (R·. 110). 
The court also submitted to the jury the issues of 
"\\'"hether plaintiff's conduct 1~tas an effectiv~e con trihu ting 
cause to her injuries, whether defendant was negligent 
in any one of four particulars, and, if so, -v.,;het.her his 
negligenee ~~a~ a proximate cause and, finally, upon 
plaintiff's request (R~ 94), the issue of 1vhether the 
defendant should be found liable under the humanitarian 
doctrinP. of last clear rllance~ 
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T}le jury returned a verdict in favor of the defend-
ant and against the }Jlaintiff, no cause of action (R. 82). 
There.after a ntotion for ne\\T tr·1al \Vas scasonab]y f11ed, 
argued and denied. This appeal follo\ved .. 
STATE::\fENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY UNDER SECTION 41-6-79 (c)t UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953~ THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN 
ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE STREET WHERE SHE DID. 
POINT II 
ANY ERROR WHICH THE TRIAL COURT MAY HAVE 
C01iMITTED WAS HARMLESS AND NOT PREJUDICIAL 
SINCE PLAINTIFF, BECAUSE OF HER NEGLIGENCEt WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO A VERDICT IN ANY EVENT .. 
... ~RGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY UNDER SECTION 41~6-79 (c), UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953J THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN 
A TTEIVIPTING TO CROSS THE STREET WHERE SHE DID. 
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To aid the ·Court in understandi11g fully the ba~is of 
t h c trial eourt 'R ruling that plaintiff \vas n egiigen t, "\\;re 
shall analy~e and at tr.rupt t.o determine the pu.rpose and 
meaning of the statutor-y provisions upon 1rvhich the 
ruling 'vas based. 
The stat.nt.P involved is Section 41-6-79, 1Jtah Code 
Annotated~ 1953, the pP.rtinent sub~ser.tions of \vhirh read 
as follo1rvs : 
'~(a) Every pedestrian crossing a road'\\}'ay 
at any point othP.r than within a marked cross~ 
walk or v.;rithin an unrnarked crosswalk at. an inter-
section shall yield the right-of~ V{ay to all vehicles 
upon the road1vay .. ' ' 
" (c) Between adjacent intersections at 
"'hich traf fie control signal~ are in operation pe-
destriB.Jls sha.ll 'Ytot cross at any plac.e except in a 
marked crosswalk~ 1' ( liJrnphasis added.) 
The next preceding statutory section rcq uircs the 
driver of a vehi(!le to yield the ri.ght-of~\vay to a pede~­
trian crost5ing the road,,.,ray \vith.in a eross\valk, 'vith 
certain exceptions 'vhieh arP tJnlrntterial here. 
These three provjsions of the statutes provide the 
basic law governing the relative rights and duties of 
pedestriant5 and automobile drivers at points 'vhich arc 
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not gove1ned hy traffic contrDl 8ignals. The difference 
in language utilized in tl1ese seetions i~ f.;ignifjc.ant and 
should be recognized h}· thiR (~ourt Three situations 
seem to he eontc1nplated by these ~er.t.!ons of the la"\v: 
First. If a pedestrjan i~ v{ithin a crossv.-alk,. the 
aut.o1nobile dri.ver must yield the rigltt-of-way to the 
pedest.r1an, except jn situation~ not pertinent here. 
Second. It is recognized that a pedestrian may have 
the right to cross a street at a point other than within 
a crossv.ralk but if he docs so, he rnust yield the right-of~ 
1vay to an on-eorning automobile. 
Third. In certain areas, involving situations clif-
ferent frotn either of those just discussed, a pedestrian 
is prohibited from crossing the street at any place except 
in a rna-rked cross\vallc 
Sub~section (e) of Section 41-6-79, 'vhieh prohibits 
a pedef.;trian fron1 crossing tlte street at other than desig-
nated points, is absolute and positive in its language and 
obviously \v.a~ pa~sed v..,.hen earlier, less definite la\rS, 
failed to provide protection against. the dangers of 
rnodern traffic flo\'{ in busy dov..-iltO"W'll areas. 
The history of the legislation seems to furnish sup-
port to this interpretat.ion. _A_s revealed by Compiled 
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La,~...-s of C tah~ 1917, the fir~ t statutory provisions rela t-
ing to lllotor vehicles and operatots covered less than 
five pages in tl1e codG, and all la\V8 relating to motor 
veh iele~, their registration, licensing, equip1nent and "\\~hat 
1vere styled as ~'rules of the road" Vt'ere encon1passed in 
but t\ver1t.y sections of the code. The 'vord ''pedeRtrian~' 
\VaS apparently then lillkllOV.lll in the ron text of tra r"fic 
regulation and control. 
The first la-v{ directed at eon trolling pedestrian cross-
ing of highvla~ys is found in the 1921 ... -\1nendrnent to 
Section 3985 of Compiled La,vs of l~tah, 1917. The law, 
a~ amended, prohibited crossing of a high\vay ~~except at 
a regular crossing thereof, provided such crost5ing is 
\\~ithin three hundred feet of another regular crossing on 
the same .high,~ray ... '' 
This v.·as the first attempt to prevent pede~tria.ns 
frum appearing upon traveled road,vays at unex1iect.ea 
places~ It \:ra~ obviously an att.ernpt to emphasize to an 
unsuspecting public the dangcr8 inherent in the automo~ 
bile age. 
The first comprehensive st.atute regulating t.raffic on 
highways "\\7as enacted by the 1egislature as Chapter 49, 
Laws of l~tah, 1931. This statute, entitled ""Unifol'nt Act 
Regulating Traffic on Highwa~ys '' carried fonvard the 
idea that pedestrians should use cross~~alks in crossing 
a road"'"ay, that if they crossed at pointE; ot.her than in 
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cross~'alks they wrere required to yield the right-of-\ray 
and, finally, a::1 to certain areas, pedef-;trians "\vere pro~ 
hibited from erosslng the road1rvay at alL 
ln Section 39 of that act, local author11 ies were given 
p o1rver to require by ordinance that '~.. . . at intersections 
''rher.-e traffic. is controlled by traffic control signals or 
hy police offic.ers, IJedel:1trians shall not cross a roadway 
again~t. a red or 'stopt signal, and between adjace-nt inter-
~ectionr.; so controlled -Rhall not cross at any plar,e except 
in a marked or unmarked crosswalk.'' 
~phis provision, giving local authorities the option to 
prohibit eertain crossing attempts, was apparently :found 
inadequate by the legislature in view of the ever-increas-
ing number of automobiles upon the highway. Thus, in 
1941, the legislature found it necessary to enlarge the 
Lrniforn1 Act R.egulating Traffic on Highways and for 
the first tirne, under Section 66 of Chapter 52, La\vs of 
lJ tah, 1941 ~ nut).. be found the provj si on, effective 
throughout the State regardless of the ae.t of local 
authorities, that pedestrians shall not cross at any place 
except in a marked cross,valk ,:~between adjacent inter-
sections at '\vhich traffic control signals are in operation.'' 
This development of the law reveals a continuing 
attempt by the legislature to cope 1Vith the mounting 
dangers and comple-xities of modern traffic. Obviously 
. .,. 
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the l~·g-1 ~latun_~ found that leaving an option to local traf-
fic control to }Jrotect perlestrjan~ in busy arr:as 1vas insnf-
ficient. It 'vas determined that there should be stat e"\vid c 
p t·ot(_~e.L] nn for pedestrians ft.nd n1otorists alike in con~ 
hc\sted arcas1 suc.h as do·\~,nttov'";n bu~iness districts, and 
that pedestrians should have r-un ple opportunity to cro8s 
a strePt but only "\vith the protection of traffie signals 
or· rna1'kefl rross\vallu-~. Butt hPeau8e traffic in ~ueh areas 
is so heavy and so con Rtan t and th~ danger of accidents 
is, tl1eref"orc, ~o great~ t.he legi~latnre fonnd it necessary 
to prohibit erot:1s ing at other than speci fi ed areas ~-- ~ 11 
other ~'ords, to prohibit ~~jay 1A'alking. ~' 
Thus, a pedestrian standing on the ~outh side of 
~econd South Street bet-\vPen ~fa in anrl State Streets, i::; 
not allo\\'ed to crosf.; to the north across Sernod Soulh 
Street. to Regent Street except by the us0 of" the only 
marked pedestrian e.ross,valk, \vhich is found on the ea.~t 
Rirlc of the inte r~ettion as an ex ten~ ion of the Regent 
Street ~idc\\~alk. )lotorists are entitled to asR11n1e, and 
do assl1lriP1 that pedestrians \vill not bG found in any 
other area of Second South bet\\'een .\1 ain and Slate 
Streets except in thr. 1narked cross\valk or at interser~ 
tions ~'liere traffic eontro1 ~ignal~ are in operation. 
As is "\vell lrnO"\\'ll to all \vho 1 ivc in this Cit.y2 there 
are man~i more instanees in the do,vntoVt:n area -.,vhere 
similar "T'' intersections are found. They are found on 
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~tate Street, ln:~t,veen South Teu1ple and First South 
NtTeet~ and bet:\veen ]"1irst and Second South Street 
~;\_long South rremple Street~ opposite tlte Templ~ 
grounds~ is anotlu.~r, forn1ed by the Richardf.; Street inter-
section and another itJ one block to the south .. Others are 
located on \\Test Tern Dle Street, .!\fain Street and Fourth 
South Street. 
.... ;\.t each of thege, there is but one marked crosswalk 
'':hich pedestrians 1nay use and each such area~ like the 
area jilVolved in this ease, is clearly vlithin the eontein-
plation of Section 41-6-79 (e). 
Sinee the la-\v in question hnposed a duty upon the 
plaintiff, it i~ \Veil to examine the situation confronting 
her a~ she emerged from the alley onto tl1e V{est side-
\Yalk of State Street on the day in question4 As she did 
~o, she 'va~ confronted 'vith the identical situation con-
fronting a pedestrian on the south :.=ide of Second South 
Street \\'·ho wjshes to cross to tl•e north in the middle of 
the block. As to this plaintifft there "~ere no streets 
entering State Street fron1 the 'vest het.ween the inter~ 
~ection~ of :X orth Ten•ple and South rl'emple Streets 
and the sidewalk, throughout that block, js unbroken 
hy any intersection or enter.ing road,vay~ just as is the 
ease along the south side or Second South Street in the 
l1eart of the business distriet. 
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Clearly, tlterefo t·e, flt; to the plaintiff upon 'vhon1 
this duty of care reHted, South Temple Street and North 
r1\~1uple Street constituted ~'adjacent intersection~" a~ 
those \vords are used in the statute and it iH equally 
elear~ there Pore, that ghe 'vas proh ihited by this la'v 
front cros~ing the street at an}' point otl1er than in a 
1narked cros~"\\ralk. 
The phra8e .. ~adjacent intersection" has apparently 
not been defined by this Court a11d our researeh .ha:-; 
failed to reveal a definition l1y other· courts. ~J.lhe \Vord 
~·adjacent" is defined hy \V PhRter~s New International 
Die..tionary·, l~nabridged Second 1£dition (1957) as ;;'ly.i11g 
near, close or contiguous; ne.lghboring; .... objects are 
adjaeent when they lie close to eaeh other, but not neces-
8 ari t y in actual contact.'' 
As is conceded by plaintiff in .her brief, the "\\'ord 
"'adjacent" is relative in meaning and its construction 
should be determined by the context in vlhit.h it is used 
in a statute. 
rrhe Circuit Court of Appeals for tlte Fourth C~ir­
euit, in Brotherhood lnv. On. v. Coal River n1i-ning Co., 
46 ~.,.2d 976, sets forth a nurnbcl' of Ineanings to the 
word, as determined by the courts in various jurisdic-
tions.. ()f interest to this case is the Circ.uit Court's 
approval of the follo~ing language: 
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'~ ..~.-\.djaeent does not Inc an adj oini11g, 1Ju t in 
the neigl1borhood of 7 or convenient, or near to the 
spaec ~peeifiert" 
Tf the pnrpo~t.~ of the f.;tatnt.e i~ kept in Inind, it is 
ahnn d.antl y clear, under ordinary u~ages of the 1rvord 
~~adjaeenl.,'~ that North Temple Kt.rcet. and South Temple 
Street as tJ1e")' eru~sed State Street, "\Yf:re ~'"near to the 
space specified" and \ver·e .:'eon venicnt't and they constia 
t.uted ~'adjacent intr.rReetions'' jn 1'elation to plaintiff's 
pu~ition before she attempted 1 o cross the street. 
lJ ndc r thi8 Ja.,\7 , plaintiff had thP .-.boice, a~ she 
erncrgcd from the alle~y- onto the State Street. ~ide\va.P~ 
at a point directly 've~t of the end of Jl,!rs1 ~\venue, of 
either "\va.lking ~outh to South Temple StrP:et and crossing 
1rvi th the protection of the traffic signal or of 'v alki ng 
but a fe\v- steps to the north to the Ina1·ked pP(1f~1rirul 
cro~s1valk indieated b~y ti1e Inap, Exhibit 1. She r.ho~e, 
ho1~n~ver, not to avail herself of either of 01ese protected 
areas and att.cn1ptcd to (·rn~s the !:1treet, in a driving 
sno\v~torn•~ at a point v,~l1ere there \vas absolutelY no 
1narking or indication of a cross\va1k 'vhich vlould give 
her perntiHs1on to nse U1e street at that point 
It 1-vas the vie\\r of the trial court, in the light of the-
t-;tatutes involved, that plaintiff '\\-a8 in that class of 
person~ <](_~signed to be protected by the prohibition of 
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Section 41-6-79 (c).. The fac.ts Vtrere not in dispute that 
plaintif£1 in crossing the street, did not use the Inarked 
pedestrian crosSVt7alk and the court, theref oret ruled that 
she violated the statute under discussion and that such 
violation eonsti tnt ed negligence .. 
In this, the court was clearly .. correct In f-l orth v. 
Cartwright (l~tah, 1951), 229 P.2d 871, this Court~ in 
speaking of another section of the traffic code, said: 
"These statutes were promulgated for the 
protection of the public and to safeguard prop-
erty, life and limb of persons using the high\\7ays 
from accidents of the type here involved. Vio1a~ 
tions of these statutes then, constitutes negligenee 
in law..tt 
The Court. the,n quoted 'vith approval the earlier 
Utah case of White v~ Sh·ipley,.. 48 Utah 496, 160 P. 441: 
"When a standard of duty or care is fixed by 
law or ordinance, and such law or ordinance has 
reference to the safety of life, limb, or property, 
then, as a matter of necessity, a violation of such 
law or ordinance constitutes neg I igence. '' 
It was,. and is, the view of the defendant that such 
a ruling by the court rendered IDlnecessary any discus-
sion of whether or not plaintiff was utilizing an ''un-
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n1arked cross·vl/alk at an inter~ection~' as tl1at tern1 is 
util i?Jed in snb-Rer.tiou (a) of Section 41-6-79. The defend~ 
ant:t~ requests for jury ir!~tr·ll.('tions (R .. 95) '-\'ere sub-
lnitled on this theory. It \11/aS, and is, the vie\\' of the 
def e11 dan t t.l• at the t\v o sub-s p.cti ons of thi~ statute clearly 
r.ontP.ln plate different situation8 and that if one it:; in-
volved the other neee8sarily cannot be. This is because 
suh-seeti.on (e) prohibits crossing the street at all in 
certain a.r e as "\V here as sub-ser.ti.on (a) a 1J o \Vs cr o ~sing at 
other areas but i1nposes a speelljic duty upon the pedef:l-
trian to yield t.he rigl•t~of-v.ray if he chooses to eros~ the 
street ~'ithout using a croRswalk. 
·1 t \VOnld ~eem to the defendant that if it once be 
deter1nine-d that an area is forbidden to pedestrian traf-
(ie, under sub-section (c), it is then ineonsistent and 
illogical to rille that a pedestrian is negligent. in using the 
''forbidden area'' only if she fails to yield the right-of-
'vay to an onco·nl ing auto1nobile4 
This~ ho \Veve r, was the position taken by the trial 
court b~y its instruction No. 7 and the p1ain tiff~ having 
been declared negligent under in8truction X o .. 6, v-.,..as in 
effect given a ne'v "1ease on life~' by instruction X o. 7, 
1\1'"hich left to the jury the determination of her negli-
gence or lack of it. It would appear, therefore, that if 
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the court was in error in this regard, the error was cer-
tainly harmless to the plain tiff and, in fact, aided her 
cause. 
·rhe language of Section 41.-6-79 (c) is clear and 
definite in its meaning. The history of the statute shovls 
that it was conceived for the protection of all \vho use 
our heavily traveled street~. Under such circumstances, 
the Court should apply the familiar rule it approved in 
E1)a-n.s v. R-eiser ( LT tah, 1931), 78 Utah 253, 2 P .2d 615 : 
''Where the language of a statute is plain 4 •• 
and conveys a definite and sensible meaning, the 
court must enforee it according to the obvious 
rneaning of the words employed ~ .. " 
Under all the circumstances, the trial court correct I y 
ruled that plaintiff, in at tern pting to cross the street 
bet\veen adjac.ent intersections where traffic eontrol sig-
nals were in operation, was negligent as a matter of la'v 
in failing to use a marked crosswalk. 
POINT II 
ANY ERROR WHICH THE TRIAL COURT MAY HAVE 
COMMITTED WAS HAR11LESS AND NOT PREJUDICIAL 
SJNCE PLAINTIFFt BECAUSE OF HER NEGLIGENCE~ WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO A VERDICT IN ANY EVENT. 
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Before plaintiff is entitled to a reversal of this 
j Lidgrncnt, she must carlJ'~ the hurd en of eo11 vi ncing this 
Conrt that error 'vas conunittcd, that the error 1''acl 
p1·c j udieial and that it adve rs Pl~y- affected her substantial 
rights. Rule 61, 1Jtah Rule~ of (;ivil Proeedure .. 
J 1. is a1sn ineulnbent upon p1aint.iff to sho\\', as she 
geeks a reversal, that ~tthere is at least a fair likelihood 
t.hat the result "'ould l1ave been different" in the trial 
ronrt, except for the erl'ors she clahns or~,urred. Starf.in. 
v. J.lladswn (1951), 12.0 ·ctah 631, 2:j7 P.2d 8:34; Joseph v .. 
1T7 .. H. Groves Latter~Day Sai~nts Hospital [. Ct.ah, 1957) ~ 
;318 p ~2d 330. 
l)e rend ant. r..on tendR that plaintiff has completely 
failed to fulfill the requirement~ demanded by the R.uJe 
and the decisions cited. The record, in ~tead, reveals this 
to be a ease sjtnilar in effect to Butler v. Payne, 58 l~tah 
383, 203 P .. 869, dec.ided nearly 40 years ago. 
In that case, t.h.i~ Court concluded its discussion of 
a \Vr ongful death ac1:ion, in \vbich plaj ntiff harl appealed 
rl'Oln an adverse verdict, in the follov.ing language: 
''No matter "\vhat the tria] court did or said, 
or -failed to do or say, .it cannot alter or change 
the physical conditions whicl1 irresistibly compel 
the c-onclusion that plaint.Jff's intestate did not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
exercise reasonable care for his own safety~ and 
that his own carelessness was the proxhnate cause 
of the accident which resulted in his dP.ath. Th~ 
trial court ought to have granted the motion for 
a directed verdict.. If the jury had found in favor 
of the plaintiff,. it would have been our duty, as 
a matter of la,v, to set the verdict aside and 
reverse the judgment.~' 
·under the guidance of this principle and upon appli-
cation of the law governing the rights and duties of 
pedestrians in crossing the street8~ the record 1n this 
case conclusively reveals that plain tiff \vas gu i 1 ty of con-
tributory negligence vlhich bars her fro1n recovery re-
gardless of whether the statute previously discussed 
'w·as properly applied by the trial eourt. 
The jury reasonably could have inferred from the 
evidence that as plaintiff stepped fro1n the west curb of 
State Street~ the defendant's autornobile o,vas then in 
the process of turning into the center lane for south~ 
bound traffic on State Street The car v.ras there to be 
seen and it was obvious that if she continued, she would 
be !n danger.. N everthelesst she continued.. Thus, plain-
tiff is impaled upon the horns of the familiar dilemma 
that she either looked and failed to heed Vt1hat s t1 e sa'v 
or that she did not look and eontinued across the street 
oblivious to the danger and to the impending accident. 
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Jfrom the uncontradicted evidence, plaintiff did not 
look. She 'vallred straight ahead, "\vit.hout turning ber 
head and carrying an object over head to shield her face 
from the wet snov{ 'vhich 'vas tailing. 
A. t a.nJr time from the time she Vt'aB 3 or 4 feet into 
the street, she could have avoided this accident merely 
hy stopping or reducing her paee to a suffieient extent 
to allo\v the automobile to go by. Sin cc she \vas not 
looking she "\vas unable to use even the slightest physical 
effort to avoid harm to herselfr 
Even if the defendant should be said to have been 
11egllgent~ .it is apparent from the jury~s verdict that it 
found he had no clear opportunity to avoid this accident. 
It \\"ill he recalled tl1at the court instructed the jury to 
av~'ard a vcrdiet to plaintiff if it deterruincd that.· the 
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid this accident. 
oin(·c~ the sympathies of the jury obviously rested upon 
this spry and attractive little lady, it is apparent that 
even under the humanitarian doctrine of last clear 
chance, tJLe jury could find no ,,~ay to aid her .. 
Plaintiff cannot escape the f-orce of the decision of 
this Court in JJ.£ngus v. Olsson (l;tah, 1949), 201. P.2d 
495, lJ it Utah 505. In tl1at case thls Court held: 
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"l\iore convincing than the direct testimony 
that deceased did not look, is the further evidence 
that deceased neither f.;aid nor did anything to 
indiea te that he 'vas at a] l a\vare of the danger 
presented by defendant's approac.hing automobile~ 
He seems to have been 1vholly una.,vare of its 
a pproac.h. Certainly he did not. hi ng either to 
\varn his ''rife, nor t.o rescue either him~ elf nor 
her front their position of peril.. On this evidence, 
it must be ~aid as a matter of la"Y\7 that deceased 
either failed to look~ or having looked, fajlerl to 
see what he ~hould have seen~" 
~' ...... A pedestrian crossing a public street in 
a crosf·n.valk or pedestrian lane, although he rnay 
have the right of "' ..a y over vehi.cula r traffic, none-
theless has tlte duty to observe for such traffic .. 
Clearly, decedent neglected that duty in this case .. 
It follo1\'S that he 'vas contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law. Of course, \Ve do not mean 
to imply tltat a mere glanc.e in tta~~ direction of 
the approaching automobile \vould suffice.. The 
duty to look has inherent in it the duty to see 
'"'hat is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it.'' 
Plaintiff "ras struck near the point designat-ed by the 
horizontal letter ~~pj' on Exhibit 1. She \vas in the center 
lane for southbonnd traffic, about 14 feet cast of the 
curb from which she had stepped .. At any time before 
she crossed the first southbormd traffic lane, she could 
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have stopped or slowed and this accident \\'ould not have 
oc.curred.. She did not need the agility of an athlete, as 
she llO\'{ c-ornplains in her brief. 
She did not stop nor did she he~itate. Instead, she 
eontinued her n1ea~ured pace, neither increasing it nor 
dP.Pr~~a~ i ng It and never once looked or gave any other 
.indication that she \VaR avrare that any other person or 
thing might be on the street she "\Vas attcntpting to cros;'3. 
l~nder ~uch circurnstanecs, plaintiff'~ eonduct falls. 
squarely "\vithin the doctrine of :'!1:n.tros v~ Olsson, and the 
effect of that deci~ion ear11~ot be i.utpaired Ol' reduc.ed by 
resort to vivid quotation~ from an unidentified "'Per-
sonal Injury ::.\ e"\v~letter,'' as iP. attempted jn plaintiff~s 
briPf~ 1\i.th its excerpt~ rrom t \VO recent Jl ir..higan r.ases. 
Eac-h of the .&.·1 irlligan caRes ~'as decided in favor of 
the plainti i"i" but neither preRented facts even remotely 
~~l~J llar to those 'vith 1..vhich \Ve are concerned in the 
present easer 
-~.,or example, in the e.ited case of Bartlett v. l.l.lelzo 
(~Iich., 1958), SS N."l\r.2d 518, tlu_~ decedent had crossed 
a "\\Tide street and had his foot upon the r.:u rb of the other 
side 'vhen he 'vas struck by one of t.,ro automobiles 
engaging in a ~~drag race" fron1 a traffic light one city 
block R\vay. When the decedent had started to cross th~~ 
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street., the traffic light had not changed and yet b~y the 
time his foot had reached the opposite curb the racing 
autoinobiles had traversed the ei(r block and one of 
thein r.ut over into the curb area and struck him. 
Defendant prefers to rest his case upon controlling 
dec.is ions of similar cases in this ju ri~dietion, rather than 
upon decisions of dissimilar cases by the court of a mid-
v.restern state. 
In 1'1ingus v. Ol~su-n, the Court, for purposes of the 
appeal, a8sumed that the pedestrian involved had been 
in a cro sswa 1 k and \vas, there£ ore, afforded the p rotec-
tion given to pedestrians in such araas. Ho,vever, i.rt 
the ease at bar, the jury had ample reason to i.nfer fron1 
the physical evidence and the testimony of the police 
officer that plaintiff 'vas 1\,.allring diagonally across the 
street to reach her hotne and 1vas outside the area eu~ 
compassed bet,veen an extension of the side,valk lines 
on the south side of First Avenue. Tt is true the court 
instructed the jury she was not 'Nithin an "unmarked 
crosswalk at an intersection" as that ter1n i8 used in 
the statutes. The point is, hov,tcver, that even if the 
court had not so instructed the jury, the jury could have 
found, from the evidence and inferences in the record, 
that pJaintiff was not in an area in 1vhich she received 
the protection of the law. 
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CndGr such a finding, plaintiff would be barred from 
rPeovcry beeause of the j1nplications of the rule in Sant 
v. JJf.i:llfr ( lJtah, 1949) 206 P.2d 719, in \vhich the ·Court 
held: 
"'A greater degree of care is necessary upon 
the part of a pedestrian \Vho undertakes to cross 
a cit)' st teet at a p1·ohibited place than is plaeed 
on one \vho uses a marked eross-.valk'' 
In an effort to avoid thiR posRibility, plaintiff's brief 
argues that clef endant "'\\,..as familiar with the intersection 
and presumably knew that a custom existed to use that 
area of the street as a cro~ sing plaee for pedestrians. 
In support of this theory, plaintiff cites a Louisiana caEe 
and a Pennsylvania caE:e decided in 1915. 
TI1e Louisiana case can s j!.arc.ely be called aut ho ri-
ta ti ve, in vieVt' of the unusual, canonical laws o £ that 
juris diction .. 
-~L,he Pennsylvania case proves to involve an instance 
in \vhich the autoinobile driver violated a la-\v by passing 
a tearr1 of horses and a \vagon on the 'vrong s.ide.. Fur~ 
t.her~ the dece?-sed pedestrian had been '-\1allring on ~ .. cross-
ing stones'' \vhifJh had been laid from the curb to street-
ear tracks in the center of the street.. Persons intending 
to board streetcars used the crossing stones to reach the 
track and both the trac.k and the row of stones \vere 
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notice to a driver that IJede~trians crossed there. TJnder 
such circumstances, the Pennsylvania court properly held 
that the decedent's contributory negligence "'~as a jury 
question, instead of a matter of la"\\"~" for the court to 
decide. 
Defendant believes the 'veight of authority and the 
better reasoned cases on t.his point are exe1nplified hy 
the recent decision of the l~ourt of _._~ppeals of Mary~ 
land in the ease of Jlenderson v .. Brown (~fd., 1957):t 135 
A.2d ~Sl. In that case a pedestrian "\\7as injured by a 
taxicab and the evidence revealed that many sailors in 
the eity of Port Depo~it r:r·ossed the ;;.treet at the point 
where tlte accident occurred" 1\~hich fact was kn nwn to 
the defendant eab driverr 
f"l,he pedestrian urged that such use by the sailors 
had established ''an informal eross~~alk" and it was con-
tended that the defendant should be held to have expected 
pedestrians in that area .. 
The Maryland court rejected this contention and 
noted that there \vere officially n1arked eross,valks '~near­
by.'' But the court said that even if there had not been, 
their a bsenee would not entitle pedestrians ". .. . by 
custom or habit to establish a cross-\valk which then gives 
them the right-of~way .. ' ' 
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So~ 1n this ease1 plaintiff'~ .ns~ertion that. ''every~ 
body goes a eros~ there/~ even if eou pled \vit 1• dPfendant'8 
~ta tenl' ~n t that he had ~(~Cll ~'people . . ~ jay1valking 
l here'~ canr1ot ~erv~e to change the \Vrittcn la·w·~ ,v·hlch 
\Vfl.~ pa~t:1ed for the protection of all "\vho use our streets. 
CONCL LJSIO~ 
The trial eonrt interpreted tl1e prineipal 8tatute 
i rl v o1 'led in this ea~e, Seetion 41 -6-"79 (e), in the only 
logi('nl and teasonable 'vay, ~o tllat thoHe persons who 
tno~t. g-reatly needed protccti.OTl f.ron1 1nodern traffic -
the l)Cdcsteian~ ~- eould find easily aeccssible and safe 
a eca~ in 'vhieh to t r,o~s he a v il.Y travel cd st. r<..~et.~. .A con-
trary interprctati..on \vould destroy the obviou~ purpose 
and intent of the statute and \Vfluld render nv:aningless 
thP protee.tion it \Vas designed to provide4 
It i6 so"Inc·v,rhat paradoxical that tills intPrpretatlon~ 
"\\7hich gives rnaxiinurn effect to the la,\·, should be so 
vigorously attaekcd by thi~ S.:J. --:;~ear old plaintiff who~ 
perhaps n1ore than all other·s~ needs its protection the 
1nost. 
N owhcrc in her brief does the plaintiff present any 
argument or authority in opposition to the trial.courl's 
construction of this statute and of the v?ords ''"between 
adjacent intersections~' as they are used in the context 
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Df this la1v. After conceding that the '\Vord "adJacent" 
is relative in its meaning~ plaintifr is content to rest her 
argurnent upon the citation of tvt.~o ca.se8 from OklahonHl 
and in each of these, the court was concerned 'vith the 
use of that v""ord as it is found in Oklahouta statutes 
relating to acquisition or annexation of lands b-:,r school 
district:;; or cities~ 
Plaintiff, 'vho ignored the protect1on of a marked 
c.rosswalk, who blindly V~-7alked through a sno\vstorm 
across a busy street without looking or otherv,~ise pro-
tecting herself,. bas demonstrated conclusively that she 
is not entitled to recover, that the verdict was correct 
and that the judgment should be affirn1ed~ 
Respectfn ll~y submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
and JOHN H~ SNOW 
A tt0"1"n.ey 8 for Defendant a-nd Respondent. 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City~ Utah 
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